We define Markov strategy and Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) for games with observable actions. Informally, a Markov strategy depends only on payoffrelevant past events. More precisely, it is measurable with respect to the coarsest partition of histories for which, if all other players use measurable strategies, each player's decision-problem is also measurable. For many games, this definition is equivalent to a simple affine invariance condition. We also show that an MPE is generically robust: if payoffs of a generic game are perturbed, there exists an almost Markovian equilibrium in the perturbed game near the initial MPE. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.
INTRODUCTION
Strategic phenomena studied in economics and the other social sciences are often intrinsically intertemporal in nature, and therefore require a dynamic formulation. In their study of dynamic interactions, many researchers have focused on the class of strategies variously called``Markovian,''``statecontingent,''``payoff-relevant,'' or (for stationary games)``stationary.'' Such strategies make behavior in any period dependent on only a relatively small set of variables rather than on the entire history of play.
For example, consider a dynamic game in which, in every period t, player i 's payoff ? actions A i t depend only on % t : A i t = A i t (% t ) and that % t is determined (possibly randomly) by the previous period's actions a t&1 and state % t&1 . Finally, assume that each player maximizes (the expectation of) a discounted sum of per period payoffs: E( t $ t&1 ? i t ). In period t, the history of the game, h t , is the sequence of previous actions and states h t =((a 1 , % 2 ), ..., (a t&1 , % t )). But the only aspect of history that directly affects player i 's payoffs and action sets starting in period t is the state % t . Hence, a Markov strategy in this model should make player i 's period t action dependent only on the state % t rather than on the whole history h t .
In this example, it is quite clear how a Markov strategy should be defined, primarily because the set of period t payoff-relevant states 3 t is given exogenously. In an arbitrary dynamic game, by contrast, we must first derive the set of states in order to discuss Markov strategies. In the Markov literature, this has been done in largely ad hoc fashion: the question of which variables to include in 3 t has been normally decided on a case-by-case basis.
We propose a general treatment. A major task of this paper and its companion [14] is to show that the payoff-relevant states and therefore the concept of an equilibrium in Markov strategies (Markov perfect equilibrium or MPE) can be defined naturally and consistently in a large class of dynamic games. In this paper we concentrate on games with observable actions, 1 in which case, the period t history h t is known to all players before they choose their period t actions.
As we have noted the concept of MPE a refinement of Nash equilibrium figures prominently in applied game theory. In our view, this fact already justifies giving it greater theoretical attention. The concept's popularity stems in part from several practical considerations. First, MPE is often quite successful in eliminating or reducing a large multiplicity of equilibria in dynamic games, and thus in enhancing the predictive power of the model. Relatedly, MPE, by preventing non-payoff-relevant variables from affecting strategic behavior, has allowed researchers to identify the impact of state variables on outcomes; it for example has permitted researchers to obtain a clean, unobstructed analysis of strategic positioning in industrial organization. A second pragmatic reason for focusing on MPE is that Markov strategies substantially reduce the number of parameters to be estimated in dynamic econometric models. Such models can therefore be more easily estimated and the Markov restriction subjected to a specification test. The validity of the Markov restriction can also be assessed in experiments as in [15] . Finally, and relatedly, Markov models can readily be simulated. Indeed Pakes, Gowrisankaran and McGuire developed a Gauss program capable of computing Markov perfect equilibria. 2 MPE embodies three philosophical considerations besides its practical virtues. First, Markov strategies prescribe the simplest form of behavior that is consistent with rationality. Strategies depend on as few variables as possible; they involve no complex``bootstrapping'' in which each player conditions on a particular variable only because others do the same. This is not to imply that we find bootstrap behavior uninteresting but only to suggest that its polar opposite Markov behavior is equally worthy of study. Indeed, a large literature on bounded rationality has developed arguing that simplicity of strategies is an important ingredient in good modeling.
3 Second, the Markov restriction captures the notion that`b ygones are bygones'' more completely than does the concept of subgameperfect equilibrium. Markov perfection implies that outcomes in a subgame depend only on the relevant strategic elements of that subgame. That is, if two subgames are isomorphic in the sense that the corresponding preferences and action spaces are equivalent, then they should be played in the same
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2 The program can be accessed by``ftping'' to econ.yale.edu, using``anonymous'' as the login, name and your user identification as the password, and retrieving all files from the directory``pubÂmrkv-eqm.'' The authors ask those who access the program to send their name, institutional affiliation and e-mail address to``mrkv-eqmÄecon.yale.edu.'' in order to keep track of the usefulness of their experiment and to send improvements.
3 Ariel Rubinstein ([17] , p. 912) offers a different perspective on the notion of simplicity:`C onsider, for example, the sequential bargaining literature in which the authors assume (rather than conclude) that strategies are stationary. That is to say, a player is confined by hypothesis to the use of offers and response patterns (response to offers made by the other player) that are independent of the history of the game. This literature presents this stationarity assumption as an assumption of simplicity of behavior. Consider, for example, player 1's strategy:``Demand 50 0 of the surplus and reject any offer which gives you less than 50 0, independent of what has happened in the past.'' Simplicity of behavior implies that player 1 plans to make the same offer and make the same responses independently of how player 2 has reacted in the past. However, this strategy also implies that player 2 believes that player 1 would demand 50 0 of the surplus even if player 1 demanded 600 of the surplus in the first, let us say, 17 periods of bargaining. Thus, stationarity implies not only the simplicity of player 1's behavior but also the passivity of player 2's beliefs. This is unusual, especially if we assume simplicity of behavior. If player 2 believes that player 1 is constrained to choose a stationary plan of action, then 2 should believe (after 17 repetitions of the demand of 60 0) that player 1 will continue to demand 60 0. Thus, assuming passivity of beliefs eliminates a great deal of what sequential games are intended to model: namely, the changing pattern in players' behavior and beliefs, as they accumulate experience.'' We are sympathetic to this point of view, but do not consider it to be a criticism of Markov strategies. Rubinstein's description suggests a game in which players are incompletely informed about each other's preferences. In this case, the appropriate version of the Markov concept is Markov perfect Bayesian equilibrium and not Markov perfect equilibrium. But in a Markov perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a game with incomplete information, beliefs are not``passive'': beliefs about a player's type are updated on the basis of his or her behavior.
way. 4 Third, it embodies the principle that``minor causes should have minor effects;'' that is, only those aspects of the past that are``significant'' should have an appreciable influence on behavior.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the model and define the concept of Markov strategy. This definition requires players to make their strategies measurable with respect to a certain partition of possible histories. More specifically, a vector of partitions, one for each player, is consistent if, at each point of time, a player's preferences over his continuation strategies are the same for any history in a given element of his partition provided that the other players use strategies that are measurable with respect to their own partitions. Section 2 provides weak conditions under which, for any consistent vector of partitions, all players have the same partition. Hence we may refer to a consistent partition, rather than a consistent vector. We show that there is a unique, maximally coarse consistent partition. Strategies that are measurable with respect to this partition are called Markovian, and a subgame perfect equilibrium in Markov strategies is called a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). For multiperiod games in which the action spaces are finite in any period an MPE exists if the number of periods is finite or (with suitable continuity at infinity) infinite.
In Section 3 we show that, for a broad class of games there is a simple criterion by which we can check whether or not two date t histories h t and h$ t lie in the same element of the Markov partition (and, therefore, whether or not a given strategy is Markovian): for each player i there must exist scalar :>0 and function ;( } ) such that for all vectors of current actions a t =(a i t , a &i t ), the player's utilities following histories h t and h$ t are linked by the following von Neumann Morgenstern (VNM) transformation,
where f t corresponds to actions taken in period t and subsequently. As mentioned above, the Markov restriction embodies the principle that`m inor causes should have minor effects;'' that is, only those aspects of the past that are``significant'' should have an appreciable influence on behavior. Actually, the Markov restriction reflects this idea in a rather discontinuous way: payoff-relevant history affects behavior, payoff-irrelevant history does not, and there is nothing in between. Indeed, this discontinuity gives rise to the following concern. The restriction to Markov strategies has force only in a game in which there exists at least one pair of distinct histories that differ only according to payoff-irrelevant variables. But by perturbing the payoffs of such a game slightly, one can ensure that the histories differ payoff-relevantly. Formally, therefore, one might criticize the Markov assumption as being``generically'' unimportant, since, in the perturbed game, Markov-and subgame-perfection are the same. But if one accepts the minor causeÂminor effect principle (MCMEP), it is natural to focus only on those equilibria that are close to MPEs of the original game. By doing so, one guarantees that those aspects of history that had zero effect on future payoff functions in the original game and, therefore, have only small effect on future payoffs in the perturbed game have only a small influence on future equilibrium behavior in the perturbed game, which is very much in the spirit of MCMEP. Thus the principle helps ensure the wide applicability of Markov restrictions. Of course, to invoke MCMEP, there had better exist equilibria in the perturbed game near the original equilibrium. That is, a form of lower hemi-continuity had better hold. In Section 4, we confirm that this indeed is the case, at least generically.
MARKOV STRATEGIES AND MARKOV PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM
Let G be a game with n players (indexed by i=1, ..., n) and T periods (indexed by t=1, ..., T ), where T can be finite or infinite. In every period t, each player i chooses an action a i t in his or her finite action space, where this space may depend on actions chosen in earlier periods. Note that although in this formulation players choose their actions simultaneously in period t, we can readily accommodate sequential games (i.e., games of perfect information) by endowing all but one player (the player who really moves in period t) with degenerate action spaces in period t. For convenience, we will restrict attention to games in which the timing of moves (who is active at date t) is independent of previous actions. Observe too that by treating``nature'' as one of the players, we can incorporate stochastic payoffs or action sets; randomness corresponds simply to a mixed strategy by nature.
Let a t #(a 1 t , ..., a n t ) and a#(a 1 , ..., a T ). The history in period t is the sequence of actions chosen before period t: h t #(a 1 , ..., a t&1 ). Let H t be the set of all possible period t histories. We shall assume throughout that G is a game with observable actions: history h t is common knowledge in period t. (See our companion piece, [14] , for the case of unobservable actions.) The future in period t is the sequence of current and future actions: f t #(a t , ..., a T ). We assume that players have von Neumann Morgenstern preferences over action sequences. Thus, player i 's preferences are representable by a utility function u i (a)=u i (h t , f t ). A (behavior) strategy s i for player i is a function that, for all t and each history h t # H t , assigns a probability distribution to the action space
, where 2(X) denotes the set of probability distributions on set X. Let S i be the set of strategies for player i. Given t and history h t # H t , let S i t (h t ) denote the set of continuation strategies, i.e., the set of strategies in the T&t+1 period subgame starting after h t . We will denote the vector of strategies by players other than i by s &i and the vector of all strategies by s#(s i , s &i ). Given strategy vector s, player i's expected utility is v i (s)#E a (u i (a) | s). His or her expected utility conditional on history h t is denoted by
That is, v i (s | h t ) is player i 's expected payoff if, after history h t , players behave according to s.
A subgame-perfect equilibrium ( [18] ) is a strategy vector s that forms a Nash equilibrium after any history; i.e., for all t, h t # H t , and i,
for any alternative strategy s^i. Subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) refines Nash equilibrium by ruling out empty or incredible threats. For all t, let H t ( } ) denote a partition of H t , where H t (h t ) ( H t ) denotes the set of period t histories that are in the same element of the partition as
coarser than H t ( } ) if every element of the latter is contained in some element of the former and H$ t ( } ){H t ( } ); in that case, we also say that 
be the set of all strategies for player i that are measurable with respect to H i } ( } ). For any finite set B and two real-valued functions f, f $: B Ä R, we shall write ftf $ if one function is a positive affine transformation of the other, i.e., there exist :>0 and ; such that f ( } )=:f $( } )+;.
We shall call the vector of collections ( 
It is in general possible that not all players share the same collection of partitions in a consistent vector. For instance, consider the following threeplayer game. ) constitutes a consistent vector (we can omit player 1 from the vector, because no history has yet occurred when he moves): Player 2's decision problem is the same whether A or B has occurred but it is different if C has occurred; player 3's decision problem is the same whether B or C has occurred but differs when A has occurred. Note, in particular, that H But example 1 is special in the sense that players 2 and 3 do not``interact'': player 2's actions do not affect player 3's preferences between L and R, nor vice versa. In the``nondegenerate'' case in which all pairs of players moving in the same period do interact the case that subsumes most economic games of interest it turns out (as shown in Theorem 2.1) that, in any consistent vector, all players have the same collection.
For any i and j,
i.e., w i ( } ; h t , s, a j t ) represents player i 's preferences over period t actions a i t , given that the history is h t , player j 's period t action is a j t , and all other players' period t actions and all players' future actions starting in period t+1 are determined by s.
Call a game G simultaneous-nondegenerate if for all i, for all t in which player i moves (i.e., in which his or her action space is not a singleton), 6 for all h t , h$ t # H t such that h$ t # H t (h t ), and for all j{i such that player j moves in period t, there exist strategy vector s # _S k (H } ( } )) and actions a
In words, the game is simultaneous-nondegenerate if, in any period and given any two histories h t and h$ t and any active player i, any other active player j moving simultaneously can ensure that player i 's decision problem after h t differs from that after h$ t , holding some future sequence of random actions fixed. [It may not actually be possible to hold all future actions fixed, because what actions are feasible may depend on whether (h t , a j t ) or (h$ t , a j t $) has occurred. Hence we do the next best thing by making s which determines future actions measurable with respect to the coarsest possible partition consistent with feasibility.]
is a consistent vector of collections, then, for all t, if players i and j both move in period t,
Proof. Suppose that players i and j move in period t. (2) implies a violation of (1). We conclude that h$ t # H j t (h t ), as claimed. K Except for the second half of Theorem 2.3, we will henceforth restrict attention to simultaneous-nondegenerate games and therefore, in view of Theorem 2.1, need deal with only a (single) consistent collection H% } ( } ) rather than with a consistent vector of collections.
Intuitively, we would expect that if players' strategies are measurable with respect to a consistent collection H% } ( } ) and they do not distinguish between histories h t and h$ t in period t (i.e., h$ t # H% t (h t )), then these strategies should not distinguish between h t and h$ t in subsequent periods either. That this``successive coarsening'' property need not hold, however, is illustrated by the following game. Still, example 2 is degenerate in a way that is similar to example 1: player 3 has no effect on player 2's decision problem. Accordingly, call a game backward sequential-nondegenerate if, for all i, for all t in which player i moves (his or her action set is not a singleton), for all h t , h$ t # H t such that h$ t # H t (h t ), for all a t # A t (h t ), and for all j{i such that j moves in period
where, analogous to before, w i ( } ; h t , a &i t , a j t+1 , s) denotes player i 's preferences over a i t , given that the history is h t , other players' period t actions are a &i t , player j 's period t+1 action is a j t+1 , and the non-j players' period t+1 actions and all players' actions starting in period t+2 are determined by s. In words, the game is backward sequential-nondegenerate if in any period t, any active player i 's period t decision problem can be affected by the action of any other active player j moving in period t+1, for some fixed choice of other actions (here we make the same qualification about fixing other actions as after our definition of simultaneous nondegeneracy.) It is readily verified that most economic applications of Markov equilibrium that have been considered in the literature are backward sequential-nondegenerate.
We now show that the successive coarsening property holds in games satisfying the two nondegeneracy conditions defined thus far.
Theorem 2.2. Let H% } ( } ) be a consistent collection in a simultaneousand backward sequential-nondegenerate game. If, for some t and
Proof. Consider h t , h$ t and a t as in the statement of the theorem. Choose player i who moves in period t and j who moves in period t+1. Backward sequential-nondegeneracy implies that there exist a j t+1 , a j t+1 $ and s satisfying (3). Now the strategy by each player k{i, j to play a k t in period t and subsequently according to s k is obviously measurable with respect to H% } ( } ). If (h$ t , a t ) Â H% t+1 (h t , a t ), then the strategy for player j of playing a j t+1 in period t+1 (followed by s j ) after any history h t+1 # H% t+1 (h t , a t ) and otherwise playing a j t+1 $ (followed by s j ) is also measurable with respect to H% t+1 ( } ). But then (3) violates h$ t # H% t (h t ). We conclude that (4) holds after all.
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K Define a consistent collection H% } ( } ) to be maximally coarse if there exists no other consistent collection H } %%( } ) that is strictly coarser than H% } ( } ). From this definition, it may appear as though there could exist a multiplicity of maximally coarse consistent collections (since the relation``coarser than'' is only a partial ordering), but in fact there can be only one. The intuition for this uniqueness result is that the coarsening operation exhibits a form of complementarity across players: If all other players switch to a coarser partition, the remaining player can use a partition that is weakly coarser than before (i.e., at worst the same as before and possibly strictly coarser), as he or she``needs to remember less.'' Hence, if H% t ( } ) and H t %%( } ) are both maximally coarse consistent partitions, and all players but i make their strategies measurable with respect to the finest common coarsening H% t ( } ) 7 H t %%( } ), player i can do the same. Hence H% t ( } ) and H t %%( } ) could not have been maximally coarse after all. Theorem 2.3. (i) If a game is simultaneous-nondegenerate, then there exists a unique maximally coarse consistent collection H* } ( } ). H t *(h t ) constitutes the state of the system or the payoff-relevant history.
(ii) If we do not impose simultaneous-nondegeneracy, there is a unique maximally coarse consistent vector of collections H
Proof. (i) Let 7 be the set of all consistent collections. Notice that 7 is nonempty because it includes the collection in which each period t history h t is in its own separate partition element. Define H* } ( } ) so that, for all t,
That is, H t *( } ) is the finest common coarsening (i.e., the meet) of all partitions H% t ( } ) for which the corresponding collection H% } ( } ) is consistent. Note that because H t is finite, H t *( } ) is the meet of only finitely many distinct partitions (even though there may be infinitely many consistent collections if T is infinite). We claim that H* } ( } ) is consistent. To see this, choose i, t, s
there exists a sequence [h t (1), ..., h t (m)] of period t histories such that h t (1)=h t , h t (m)=h$ t , and, for all k=1, ..., m&1, there exists a consistent collection
Because s &i is measurable with respect to k H% } ( } ), (1) and (5) imply that, for all k,
Hence (6) continues to hold when h t (k) is replaced by h t and h t (k+1) by h$ t . Therefore H* } ( } ) is consistent, as claimed. Now, by construction, H* } ( } ) is at least as coarse as any other consistent collection H% } ( } ). Therefore, H* } ( } ) is uniquely maximally coarse.
(ii) The proof when we drop simultaneous-nondegeneracy is completely analogous. K We shall define a strategy to be Markovian if it is measurable with respect to H* } ( } ). That is, s is Markovian if, for all t, s(h t )=s(h$ t ) whenever h$ t # H t *(h t ) (in which case we say that h t and h$ t are Markov-equivalent).
We call H* } ( } ) the Markov collection of partitions. Hence, Markov strategies are the simplest strategies (i.e., the strategies measurable with respect to the coarsest partition and hence dependent on the fewest variables) that are consistent with rationality in the sense that, if the other players make their strategies measurable with respect to some coarser partition H t ( } ), it would not always be optimal for a player to make his or her choice between any two given continuation strategies measurable with respect to H t ( } ). Note that, if one's measure of a strategy's complexity is the number of states an automaton requires to execute it, then the Markovian strategies are also the least complex strategies consistent with rationality.
Recall the simple example at the beginning of this paper. In that example, a Markov strategy was measurable with respect to the state space 3 t . Notice that this is precisely the same conclusion that we would draw using the general concept of Markov strategy just defined. We shall define a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) to be a subgame perfect equilibrium in which all players use Markov strategies.
Continuous action spaces. We can readily extend the above analysis to games with continuous action spaces. Indeed there is no change in any of the arguments except that it may no longer be clear that maximally coarse consistent partitions exist. To establish existence, consider a sequence of consistent partitions H Stationary strategies. Many economic models entail games that are stationary in the sense that they``look the same'' starting in any period, i.e., they do not depend on calender time. (Clearly, such games must have infinite horizons). For these games it is natural to make Markov strategies independent of calendar time as well. To capture this independence, we shall say that two histories h t and h$ t$ are action-space equivalent provided that \{ 1, $ , a 1 , . .., a {&1 ) (we are slightly abusing notation here). One then generalizes the notion of partition by allowing two histories, h t and h$ t$ , at two different dates to belong to the same element of a partition. The vector of partitions (H 1 ( } ), ..., H n ( } )
That is, condition (1) remains the same except that elements of a partition can encompass histories at different dates. One then proceeds as previously to define the stationary partition as the maximally coarse consistent partition. A strategy is stationary provided that it is measurable with respect to the stationary equivalence classes, i.e.,
Note that in``cyclical'' games in which the payoff structure in period t is the same as that in period t+km (k=1, 2, 3, ...), where m is the length of the cycle stationary strategies will, in general, depend on``cyclical time'' (i.e., the time from the beginning of the last cycle), rather than on calendar time.
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Establishing the existence of stationary perfect equilibria in stationary games that are continuous at infinity and have finite action spaces each period is not a difficult matter: Constrain each player to choose the same behavioral strategy each time he or she moves. Require also that this strategy be measurable with respect to the Markov partition. If we introduce some (Markov-measurable) trembles, then the limit of the fixed points as the trembles go to zero will be a stationary perfect equilibrium. This proof is actually borrowed from the stochastic games literature, which aims (among other things) at demonstrating existence of equilibria in``state space strategies'', where the``state'' is defined in some arbitrary manner. The proofs apply in particular to the situation in which the state space is our Markovian state space.
Existence. Proving existence of MPE for finite action spaces follows the standard lines (see our discussion paper [13] for more detail.) Assume that, for all i, t, and h t , A i t (h t ) is finite. In the case of an infinite horizon game, assume further that the game is continuous at infinity (this condition is satisfied if, for example, players discount future payoffs at a constant rate r>0). Then there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium.
To prove existence for a finite horizon game, one can, as usual, work backwards, and select the same Nash equilibrium for all histories in an equivalence class so as to obtain Markov measurability. An instructive method of proof in the infinite horizon case consists of taking the limit of (finite horizon) MPEs of truncated games. By standard arguments (see [6] ), this limit is a perfect equilibrium. That this limit equilibrium is also Markovian results roughly speaking from the fact that at a fixed date t players``should remember more'' if the horizon is longer. That is, the partition of histories into equivalence classes in the limiting game is finer than that in any game along the convergent subsequence (i.e., if h t and h$ t are equivalent in the limiting game, they are equivalent for any game in the subsequence). In Section 4 we shall exhibit an example of a different sort of sequence of games in which the limiting partition is coarser than those in the sequence (i.e., if h t and h$ t are equivalent for some game in the sequence, the same is true in the limiting game.) As we shall see, this coarseness implies that the limit of MPEs need not be Markovian.
A SIMPLE CRITERION FOR MARKOV STRATEGIES
We have defined Markov strategies as those that are measurable with respect to the maximally coarse consistent partition (the Markov partition). Although, we would argue, this is the right definition conceptually, it is a bit cumbersome practically. How does one go about finding this partition? We claim, however, that for a broad class of games there is a pair of readily checked conditions that enable us to determine whether or not two histories belong to the same element of the Markov partition.
Let H } **( } ) be the collection defined so that, for all t and for all h t , h$ t # H t , h$ t # H t **(h t ) if and only if
and (ii) for all i there exist scalar :>0 and function ;: A &i t (h t ) Ä R such that
Note that (i) requires us only to verify that action spaces following h t and h$ t are the same, whereas (ii) simply involves checking that continuation utility functions are appropriate affine transformations of one another. Indeed, condition (ii) may be viewed as a multiplayer extension of the familiar von Neumann Morgenstern invariance condition for one-person decision-problems. Note also that since the goal of this section is to find a criterion for determining whether or not strategies are Markovian that does not require actually computing the Markov partition, the criterion essentially has to be expressed in terms of``constant'' (i.e., uncontingent) strategies, since only those strategies are assured of being Markovian regardless of what the Markov partition turns out to be.
We first show that, in general, H t *( } ) is at least as coarse as H t **( } ) (Theorem 3.1). To illuminate when the two partitions are, in fact, equal, we then introduce an auxiliary partition H t ***( } ) such that h$ t # H t ***(h t ) if and only if (i) H t (h t )=H t (h$ t ), and (ii) for all i there exist scalar :>0 and function #:
It can be shown, (see [11] ), that if h$ t # H t *(h t ), then (i) and (ii) are satisfied (Theorem 3.2). Hence, H t ***( } ) is always at least as coarse as H t *( } ). (Example 3 below illustrates that H t ***( } ) can be strictly coarser). However, provided that the decision problem of any player moving in period t+1 can be affected by any player moving in period t (i.e., forward sequential nondegeneracy holds) and a fairly mild indifference condition holds, we can show, using H t ***( } ), that H t *( } )=H t **( } ).
We first show that for simultaneous-nondegenerate games, the``coarser than'' relation always holds in one direction: H* } ( } ) is at least as coarse as H } **( } ). The proof of this theorem as well as that of Theorem 3.3 are in the Appendix.
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Theorem 3.1. Suppose that a game is simultaneous-nondegenerate. For all t, the Markov partition H t *( } ) is at least as coarse as H t **( } ).
Consider now the following coarsening of H } **( } ). Let H } ***( } ) be the collection defined so that, for all t and for all h t , h$ t # H t , h$ t # H t ***(h t ) if and only if (i) and (ii) above hold. Notice that (8) is the same as (7) except 205 MARKOV PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM, I
9 The reader will note that the proofs in this section often make reference to paths of actions. That is, we will refer to preferences over strategies s i t inducing constant action paths f i t . It so happens that we can prove the theorems appealing only to paths of actions. that #( } ) may depend on other players' entire future, whereas ;( } )depends only on other players' actions in period t. Proof. For i, t, h t and h$ t such that h$ t # H t *(h t ), and any random actions f &i t , the consistency of H* } ( } ) implies that player i 's preferences over f i t given f &i t are independent of whether the history is h t or h$ t . We can think of f &i t as a random variable representing the state of nature. We are, therefore, in the realm of state-dependent preferences, and can thus appeal to Karni, Schmeidler, and Vind [11] to conclude that there exist :>0 and #( } ) such that (8) holds. 10 Hence h$ t # H t ***(h t ). K
In general, H } ***( } ) is actually strictly coarser then H* } ( } ). To see this, consider the following two-person game:
Example 3. Player 1 moves in period t and player 2 in period t+1 and conditional on history h t payoffs are as in Fig. 3a , whereas conditional on history h$ t payoffs are as in Fig. 3b .
Notice that, whether h t or h$ t has occurred, it is optimal for player 2 to play L if player 1 has played T and to play R if player 1 has played B. However, h$ t Â H t *(h t ) because, given that player 2 behaves in this way, player 1 prefers T to B after h t but B to T after history h$ t . Nevertheless h$ t # H t ***(h t ) since if we have
. This example illustrates the idea that if we permit # to depend on f &i t+1 then, indirectly, it can depend on a i t (in which case there is no reason to expect h$ t # H t *(h t )) since players other than i may condition their behavior in period t+1 (or after) on a i t . This suggests that, in a sufficiently``rich'' game (such as the example), we will have to restrict # to depend only on a &i t (as H t **( } ) requires) in order to obtain consistency. To capture the idea of richness, call a game forward sequentiallynondegenerate if for all j, all t+1 in which j moves, all h t # H t , all s # S(H } ( } )) and all i{ j such that i moves in period t, there exist a
where the argument of w j is player j 's date t+1 action. In words, the game is forward sequentially-nondegenerate if in any period t+1, any active player j 's period t+1 decision problem can be affected by the action of any player i moving in period t, for any choice of others' actions. To see that this property is satisfied in Example 3, observe that player 1 does indeed affect player 2's ranking between L and R. 
Remark. The last hypothesis in Theorem 3.3 is the fairly mild requirement that, given histories h t and h$ t (with fixed plays by other players corresponding to each history) player i has a way of playing after each history such that his or her overall payoff is the same in either case. (Note that this condition can be satisfied in mixed strategies). The condition can alternatively be formulated as follows: \h t and h$ t , \f
] is a nondegenerate interval. Expressed this way, it is obviously an open condition (as are the other two hypotheses of Theorem 3.3), in the sense that if it is satisfied by game u, then it is also satisfied by all games in an open neighborhood of u. Fig. 4 . Notice that the game is simultaneous-and backward sequentially-nondegenerate and satisfies the indifference condition in Theorem 3.3. However, it is not forward sequentially-nondegenerate because all period 3 histories belong to the same (unique) element of H 3 *( } ), and hence condition (9) cannot be satisfied for player 3. Indeed, even though B # H 2 *(A), we do not have B # H 2 **(A). Instead,
where
Because # depends on period 3 actions, it violates (7) Remark 1. With one qualification discussed below, our Markov concept is stronger than the invariance with respect to isomorphisms proposed in Harsanyi Selten ([9] , p. 73). Consider the two-player example of Fig. 5 , in which the two players move simultaneously.
FIGURE 5
Harsanyi
s continuation strategy spaces in the two subgames such that, for any player i payoff p i in subgame G, the corresponding payoff (as determined by the bijections) in G$ is : i p i +; i . By this criterion, the subgames after h t and h$ t are not isomorphic. [Note that player 1's possible payoffs after h t are [0, 1], whereas after h$ t they are [8, 6, &3, &1]. Clearly there is no affine transformation that maps the former set into the latter.] However, it is readily verified that h t and h$ t are Markov-equivalent (because for each i there exist : i >0 and ; i (a &i t ) such that each payoff p i after h t gets mapped into :
On the other hand, as noted above, Harsanyi and Selten [9] allow for`b ijection equivalence''. Their concept deems strategies played in two different subgames to be equivalent even if the action spaces in these subgames are not identical, but only related by a bijection. We have not allowed for bijection equivalence both for notational simplicity and because in most applications action spaces are in fact the same in (Harsanyi Selten [9] ) equivalent subgames, so that no extra power is obtained from imposing the stronger concept. However, we could readily incorporate``bijection equivalence'' within our definition of Markov-equivalence, in which case our notion would be unambiguously stronger than that of Harsanyi and Selten [9] . Remark 2. In deeming two decision problems to be equivalent if and only if they give rise to the same preferences over actions, we are working in the tradition of Savage who demanded that all acts (even strictly dominated acts 11 ) be ranked. Another tradition, dating back at least to Chernoff, asks only that the best act (or acts) be identified. In a game theoretic setting this alternative requirement would imply that two problems are equivalent if their best-reply sets are the same (see Mertens [16] who pursues this second notion of equivalence).
CONTINUITY
The assumption that strategies are Markovian is restrictive only if there is more than one history in some element of the Markov partition. Otherwise all strategies are Markovian, and an MPE is the same thing as a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Moreover, it is easy to see that in à`g eneric'' extensive form game in which every player has at least three available actions each time he or she moves, 13 the Markov partition consists entirely of singletons. Thus formally the Markov requirement has no bite generically. Nevertheless, as we suggested in the introduction, the principle that minor causes should have minor effects might enable us to extend the Markov``spirit'' more generally.
The issue is one of lower hemi-continuity. Fix a finite extensive form of a game with T periods, but omit the payoffs. We identify this extensive form with the set A of possible sequences of action vectors a=(a 1 , ..., a T ). Given this form the description of a game is then completed by specifying a vector of payoff functions u=(u 
} ).
We ask whether for each MPE s of game u there exists a sequence s m converging to s such that each s m is an MPE of u m . If so (and if this is true of any other sequence converging to u), then the MPE correspondence satisfies lower hemi-continuity (lhc) at s, and, for sufficiently high m, the strategies s m put little weight on aspects of the past that are not payoff-relevant in game u. In that respect, they are the true embodiment of the Markov spirit, even though, literally interpreted, the Markov restriction may be ineffective in game u m .
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MASKIN AND TIROLE 13 When there are at least three actions, a generic perturbation of payoffs changes the von Neumann Morgenstern preferences.
14 Given a fixed extensive form, the distances between two games u and u^and between two strategy vectors s and s^are defined by
where &s^i (h t )&s i (h t )& denotes the Euclidean distance between the probability vectors s^i(h t ) and s i (h t ).
FIGURE 6
Unfortunately, lhc does not hold for all games. For a counterexample, consider the sequence [u m ] depicted in Fig. 6 . 15 In each game u m , player 1 chooses U or D in period 1. Player 2 observes player 1's choice and in period 2 picks L or R. Game u m has a unique subgame-perfect (and therefore Markov perfect) equilibrium: Player 2 plays L following U and R following D, and player 1 plays U. Equilibrium payoffs are (1, 1Âm) and converge to (1, 0) as m tends to infinity. In the limit game u=lim m Ä u m , however, player 1's choice does not affect player 2's von Neumann Morgenstern preferences (u 2 (D, a 2 )=u 2 (U, a 2 )+1 for all a 2 = L or R). Thus in any MPE of u, player 2's strategy must be independent of a 1 , which implies that player 1 plays D. We conclude that lhc fails for u. Indeed, the set of MPE payoffs for u is [( ] , which is quite different from the limit point (1, 0) . This game, however, is nongeneric within the class of games having the same Markov partitions as u. This class consists of all those games for which
Game u is degenerate because it not only satisfies (10) but also the property that player 2 is indifferent between L and R. In view of this degeneracy, we are not especially concerned about the failure of lhc here. Indeed, one implication of Theorem 4.2 below is that lhc is satisfied in well-behaved (i.e., generic) games satisfying (10) .
For a given collection of partitions H } ( } ), consider the set U(H } ( } )) of payoff vectors u for which the Markov partitions are H } ( } ). Note that U(H } ( } )) is defined by a set of linear equations, and so is isomorphic to R l for some l. We will say that a proposition is true for generic (or almost all ) u in U(H } ( } )) if it is true for an open and dense subset of U(H } ( } )); that is, the proposition is generic in the class of payoff functions whose Markov partitions are H } ( } ). Note that if H } ( } ) consists entirely of singletons (i.e., no two histories are equivalent), then a proposition that is true for generic u # U(H } ( } )) is, in fact, true for generic u in the class of all games with the same extensive form (since, as we have noted, the singleton property is itself generic). An MPE s of a game u is robust if, for all =>0, there exists ! such that any game u^satisfying &u^&u&<! has an MPE s^for which &s^&s&<=. That is, an MPE is robust if, for any small payoff-perturbation, one can find a nearby MPE. Note that we do not require that the nearby game u^have the same Markov partitions as u (indeed, generically it will not unless H } ( } ) consists entirely of singletons).
A game is essential if it has only finitely many MPEs and all of these are robust. Essentiality thus ensures lower hemi-continuity. Essential equilibria have received some attention in the literature on strategic-form games 16 . Almost all such games are essential (where the definition of essentiality is unchanged except that``MPE'' is replaced by``Nash equilibrium''):
Theorem 4.1. (a) (Wu and Jiang [22] ) For a generic strategic-form game having fixed and finite strategy spaces, all Nash equilibria are robust; (b) (Harsanyi [8] ) a generic strategic-form game has finitely many equilibria.
17
Theorem 4.1 does not answer the question of whether extensive-form games are generically essential because the class of games having a particular extensive form is nongeneric in the class of games having the corresponding strategic form. 18 Moreover, a Nash equilibrium need not be an MPE. Theorem 4.2 establishes, however, that for a given collection of Markov partitions H } ( } ), almost all games u in U(H } ( } )) are essential. To prove Theorem 4.2, we will make use of the following 212 MASKIN AND TIROLE 16 See van Damme [20] for a good exposition. 17 See Wilson [21] for the first result on the generic finiteness of the Nash equilibrium set. 18 Suppose for instance that player 1 chooses between U and D in period 1 and that player 2 reacts by picking L or R in period 2. The payoff vector following U is independent of the action that player 2 would have picked if player 1 had chosen D. The associated equality constraints therefore make the payoff vector nongeneric in the space of strategic form games with two pure strategies for player 1 and four pure strategies for player 2.
Lemma. If u is essential, then (a) for all a 1 , u(a 1 , } ) is essential, and 
Proof. (a) Note first that for any a 1 , u(a 1 , } ) has only finitely many MPEs; otherwise, u itself would have infinitely many MPEs (since each MPE of u(a 1 , } ) is a continuation of an MPE of u). Consider an MPE s a 1 of u(a 1 , } ). We must show that it is robust. Let s=(a~1 , s } ) be a corresponding MPE for the overall game (note that s } must be measurable with respect to H u 2 ( } )). Consider a T&1-period game u^, near u(a 1 , } ). To prove the robustness of s a 1 , we must show that u^has an MPE near s a 1 . Now u^can be extended to a T-period game u^$ near u by setting
Because u is essential (by hypothesis), u^$ has an MPE s^$=(a~^$ 1 , s^$ } ) near s. Hence, the continuation strategy s^$ a 1 constitutes an MPE of u^( } ) near s a 1 , and so s a 1 is indeed robust.
We must show that u* is essential. Any Nash equilibrium a~1 of u* is, by construction, part of an MPE s=(a~1 , s } ) of u. Hence, because u has only finitely many MPEs, u* has only finitely many Nash equilibria. To establish, therefore, that u* is essential, it remains to show that each Nash equilibrium a~1 is robust. Consider a one-period game u% near u*. We can extend u% to a T-period game u%% near u as follows. Let
for all a 1 and f 2 . Because u% is near u*, u%% is close to u. Furthermore, for any a 1 , u%% and u have the same second-period continuation MPEs. Because u is essential, s=(a~1 , s } ) is robust, and so u%% has an MPE s%%=(a~1 %%, s } %%) near s. Since, moreover, u and u%% have the same set of continuation MPEs and u has only finitely many MPEs, s } %% must coincide with s } if u%% is near enough u. Therefore, for all a 1 ,
And so, a~1 %% is a Nash equilibrium of u%. Because it is near a~1 this establishes the robustness of a~1 and the essentiality of u*. K Theorem 4.2. Fix a finite-horizon game with corresponding collection of Markov partitions H } ( } ). Then, almost all games u in U(H } ( } )) are essential.
hypothesis implies that u$(a 1 , } ) is essential. Hence s$ a 1 is robust and so, if u^$ is near u$ in the space of all games, u^$(a 1 , } ) has an MPE s^$ a 1 near s$ a 1 . Now if u^$ is near enough u$, H 
Thus if u^$ is near u$ (and rescaled so that its minimum value is 0 and its maximum 1), (11) also holds for u^$, and so
2 (a 1 ) and so s$ a 1 =s$ a$ 1 (since s$ is an MPE for u$). This in turn means that we can assume that s^$ a 1 =s^$ a$ 1 , i.e., s^$ } is measurable with respect to H u^$ 2 ( } ). Now, from part (b) of the lemma, the one-period game u$( } , s$ } ) is essential. Thus since s^$ } is near s$ } , u^$( }, s^$ } ) is near u$( } , s$ } ) and so (from Theorem 4.1) has a Nash equilibrium a~^$ 1 near a~$ 1 . Thus s^$#(a~^$ 1 , s^$ } ) constitutes an MPE of u^$ near s$, establishing that s$ is robust and thus claim (i).
To establish claim (ii), we will again proceed by induction on T. The case T=1 is handled by Theorem 4.1. Now, from each element of H ). Now, from Theorem 3.1, if a$ 1 # H u 2 (a 1 ), then for all i there exist : i >0 and ; i ( } ) such that
Hence, because u m (a 1 , } ) is essential and converges to u(a 1 , } ), if, for all i, we define Because H* } ( } ) is maximally coarse among consistent collections, it suffices to show that H } **( } ) is consistent. Given i, consider t, h t , h$ t # H t such that h$ t # H t **(h t ). There exist :>0 and ;: A &i t (h t ) Ä R such that for all { 0, a t , a t+1 , ..., a t+{ , and f t+{+1 , Thus H } **( } ) is consistent, as claimed:
Proof of Theorem 3.3 It suffices to show that H } **( } ) is at least as coarse as H* } ( } ). Suppose therefore that for some t, h t and h$ t , h$ t # H t *(h t ). We must show that h$ t # H t **(h t ). Now, from Theorem 3.2, h$ t # H t ***(h t ). Hence there exist :>0 and #( } ) such that u i (h$ t , f t )=:u i (h t , f t )+#( f &i t ) for all f t (A.3)
